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Abstract 
Despite rapidly increasing global flows of international students, research to date has paid 
little heed to how students abroad identify and mobilise. Focusing on the experience of 
Indonesians, Malaysians and Singaporeans in Australia – a primary hub for international 
education – we explore the ways in which our informants understand their place and potential 
as students. We find international students to comprise a distinct sort of diaspora. With their 
liminal status, these – for the most part – only temporary transnationals do internalise new 
norms and agency in a personal sense. However, they tend to identify increasingly as national 
citizens and to be disinclined to mobilise politically, at least during the course of their studies. 
These findings add to our understanding both of collective identity and action among 
students, and of the broader implications of globalisation and internationalisation for social 
and political activism. 
Keywords: Higher education, globalisation, migration, mobilisation, Australia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore 
 
Contemporary globalisation is a complex of ever-faster flows and ever-broader networks, 
encompassing everything from ideas and cultural forms to money, resources and people. Or, 
as David Held describes it, globalisation “is about the stretching of connections, relations, 
and networks between human communities, an increase in the intensity of these, and a 
general speeding up of all these phenomena,” on both transcontinental and inter-regional 
levels (cited in Guibernau, 2001: 427).1 All this transpires in a context of internationalisation, 
or the increasing horizontal density of relations among state and non-state actors, increasing 
vertical links from the subnational to international levels, and enhanced transnational 
structures, both formal and informal. Elaborating on this distinction, Tarrow (2005: 8, 19) 
adds that whereas globalisation, “a source of interest, ideology, and grievances,” is what 
“produces the flows and transactions of an interwoven international capitalist economy,” 
internationalisation creates “the institutional and informal framework within which 
transnational activism – some of it aimed at globalisation but much of it independent of that 
process – takes shape.” 
Most studies of globalisation and higher education focus on institutions, cultures and outputs, 
or conceptualise the human components in terms either of how international students 
experience the educational process, or of brain drain, gain and circulation (see Robertson, 
2006). Few studies on how students internalise their experience while abroad or how they 
participate beyond their studies in their host culture examine their engagement with social 
and political issues, how their identities shift, or their potential as activists. Such questions 
fall within the ambit of studies of diaspora and transnationalism, fields dominated by works 
on long-term migrant communities, activist networks, occupational categories or steps toward 
a supranational civil society and strangely silent on the issue of students as transnationals. 
Students present an unusual form of diaspora. Technically bounded by the conditions of 
student visas, bonds or stipulations attached to scholarships and institutional regulations, 
international students are also, like all students, temporary occupants of that niche. Intrinsic 
to being a student is the pursuit of mobility, both occupational and social. International 
students may choose to study elsewhere specifically to augment such mobility in their own 
society. For example, a survey of Malaysian undergraduates in Australia found that nearly all 
felt their overseas education would boost their employment prospects, both globally and 
locally, compared with having studied at home (Sin, 2006: 249).2 However, many also seek 
longer-term geographical mobility, as they have a high propensity to remain (or attempt to 
remain) in the host country. These flows are shaped at least in part by inequities in power and 
social inequalities between generally wealthier host countries and less advantaged sending 
countries (Kell and Vogl, 2007: 19), and affect both those migrating for academic purposes 
and the education systems they join or leave. Mitchell (2001), for instance, describes the 
implications for schools in a community in British Columbia, Canada of steeply rising 
migration from Hong Kong, and the ways in which educational styles and objectives, 
particularly with regard to promotion of democratic national citizenship, have been pressed to 
adapt to newcomers’ cultural norms, expectations and position vis-à-vis the nation-state. 
At the same time, the category “student” has been expanding world-wide, as mass higher 
education becomes the norm. Enabling such growth is not just the possibility of overseas 
study, but the development of new sorts of institutions (for instance, advanced vocationally 
orientated ones), private sector initiatives, distance learning and the professionalisation of 
higher education administration (Altbach, 1999). These new options render higher education 
accessible to an ever-growing range of students, from diverse class, regional, ethnic, gender 
and religious backgrounds. As a result, universities in particular have grown all the more 
heterogeneous and potent as what Mary Louise Pratt describes as “contact zones” – “social 
spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly 
asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination” – that open new possibilities for 
intercultural mixing and identification (cited in Kenway and Bullen, 2003: 9). 
We seek in this paper to address several aspects of transnational student identity and 
mobilisation: the form and focus of their social practices; the issues that excite them; the 
extent to which their level of activism in Australia mirrors their level of activism at home; 
and the extent to which home country governments seek to control the activities of their 
citizens abroad. In order to do so, we focus on Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean 
students in Australia, cohorts with distinct national identities but key similarities in culture 
and home context. We have chosen to study these national groups, rather than the mainland 
Chinese and Indian students who now dominate the overseas student population, not only 
because Southeast Asians have a much longer history of studying in Australia but also 
because that history includes a demonstrated tendency for engagement in political activism 
while doing so.3 
Our approach combines close examination of circumstances and statistics of international 
student flows into Australia, particularly amid shifting funding and immigration regimes, and 
a series of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 30 students in a sub-set of 
universities in three Australian cities. While other studies have used large-scale survey 
methodologies to explore the experiences and attitudes of international students, a qualitative 
approach focusing in depth on a relatively small number of students fits our research 
objectives better. We selected students in each university using a purposive sampling 
technique that took into account the demographic spread of the target nationalities and level 
of study in those universities, and targeted students who were likely to be socially and/or 
politically active. Interviews, which lasted up to two hours, were conducted in Indonesian, 
Malay or English by one or both of the authors in 2008 and 2009. In Sydney, we focus on the 
metropolitan universities of Sydney and New South Wales, the former with a long and 
distinctive history of student activism and the latter at the forefront of the internationalisation 
drive, with international students – many of them from Southeast Asia – comprising 14.4% of 
its total student body as early as 1988 (Shu and Hawthorne, 1995: 119). For comparison, we 
interviewed students also at the highly internationalised Australian National University 
(ANU) in the national capital, Canberra, and at the Flinders University of South Australia in 
Adelaide, which experienced a surge in international enrolments after immigration rules were 
changed to favour graduates from campuses in regional and low-growth metropolitan centres 
from July 2003. This combination of methods and field sites couples a broad perspective on 
the theoretical issues at stake with a more nuanced exploration of individual-level dynamics. 
In our analysis, we explore the organisations and networks that international students join or 
form, the transnational links entailed (with their home country or otherwise), the identities 
around which students mobilise and the repertoires and frames they employ.4 Overarching 
these dimensions is the question of how students fit along a continuum from local to 
cosmopolitan; whether they are merely transnational, truly internationalist or something in 
between; and how that placement affects their capacity for activism. We argue that 
international students negotiate national and international identities in complex ways. They 
may best be described as “cosmopolitan locals” for their mix of agency as (upwardly) mobile, 
educated citizens and liminality in inherently temporary, subject positions, clearly identified 
with a nation-state in which they choose not to reside presently. Products of a particular stage 
in global economic neo-liberalism, the rapidly expanding ranks of international students 
present a distinctive diasporic community, important not just for education and employment 
markets, but for their particular mobilisational potential – a potential that is not, however, at 
least for Southeast Asians studying in Australia, necessarily always reached. 
Overseas students in Australia 
Australia is one of the world’s leading destinations for overseas students, notwithstanding its 
comparatively small size. Anglophone developed countries are the primary recipients of 
international student flows at all levels of education, a market dominated by the USA, the 
UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, in that order. Within Australian higher education, 
the lion’s share of students are – and have always been – from Asia, not least because of the 
legacy of Anglo-American colonialism, which left English the established language of global 
commerce and of early educational aid programmes, designed to produce a pro-Western, 
acculturated elite among former colonies (Matthews and Sidhu, 2005). Australia’s ongoing 
surge in international student enrolments started with early post-war “trade and aid” policies 
when, alongside more powerful Western countries like the USA and the UK, Australia 
cultivated Cold War allies and economic partners in the developing world through 
scholarships, textbook subsidies, institutional grants and more (Altbach, 2004: 3, 9). Most 
notable in Australia’s case was the Colombo Plan, established in January 1950 by the 
Commonwealth foreign ministers with the aim of channelling bilateral aid, including 
scholarships and training, to the developing countries of South and Southeast Asia. The 
Colombo Plan’s Technical Co-operation Scheme alone either sponsored or subsidised around 
17,000 South and Southeast Asian students to Australia, the majority of them Malaysians and 
Indonesians (Oakman, 2002). These were among a total of 40,000 Asians who came to study 
in Australia under the Plan, which remained in place for 35 years (Kell and Vogl, 2007: 14). 
Before the Colombo Plan, in 1948, there had been only 300 non-European students in 
Australia. While the Colombo Plan provided a boost to the number of foreign students in 
Australia, the number of private students greatly outstripped the number of Colombo Plan 
students in the 1950s and 1960s (Megarrity, 2005: 32-8). Although ideological pressures have 
shifted since the end of the Cold War, academic norms, institutional forms, texts and systems 
for assessment continue to flow across national boundaries, along with students and staff. An 
estimated 80% of these students travel from poorer countries to study in wealthier ones 
(Altbach, 2004: 12). 
Internationalisation is neither an automatic nor value-free process. Stier (2004: 88-92) 
identifies three key ideologies – simultaneously in play, even when at cross-purposes – 
underlying state pursuit of transborder academic flows and linkages. The first is “idealism,” 
or the belief that international co-operation will allow higher education to “contribute to the 
creation of a more democratic, fair and equal world.” Through (largely one-way) 
internationalisation, students from less-developed countries access knowledge and 
competence; their more privileged peers gain an understanding of cultural relativism and 
global variation in lives, values and ideas. The second is “instrumentalism,” or the alignment 
of educational systems and norms to facilitate cross-border labour force mobility in a 
multicultural but uniformly capitalist world or (as in the case of the European Union) to 
foster supranational identities. Last is “educationalism,” or the academic value for teachers 
and students alike of exposure to unfamiliar academic settings and norms – the principle that 
underpins the ever-increasing demand for student exchange. All three of these ideologies 
undergird aspects of the contemporary wave of internationalisation of Australian higher 
education. 
In Australia, the pace of internationalisation picked up particularly after the mid- 1980s, 
when the federal government deregulated the education sector and introduced new incentives 
for educational institutions to enter international markets (Shu and Hawthorne, 1995: 113-
15). The most notable aspect of this restructuring was the introduction of a deregulated full-
fee-paying system for international students in 1989, in line with a reframing of education as 
a source of “export” income rather than a form of development aid (Sin, 2006: 243). 
Expansion of international higher education has been a conscious state policy in Australia 
ever since, focusing both on attracting students to the country and accessing less mobile 
student markets overseas. The latter practice accounts for around one-third of all international 
students, the majority of them enrolled in Australian offshore campuses and the rest enrolled 
as external students of institutions within Australia (for details, see Healey, 2008). Attracting 
international students raises revenue through tuition and other monies spent in-country and 
creates jobs by expanding education and related service markets in Australia. Indeed, 
education has been Australia’s third highest value export since 2006 and the only one in the 
top three sources of export revenue not dependent on natural resources. In the 2008-09 
financial year, international educational services contributed A$17.2 billion to the Australian 
economy, A$9.5 billion of which was generated by the higher education sector (AEI, 2009a). 
Spurring the flows into Australia have been steps especially since 2001 to streamline, 
facilitate and clarify student visa application procedures. Under changes introduced in the late 
2000s, students were no longer required to apply for a new visa if, for instance, they changed 
education providers or courses; both they and their family members could work for the 
duration of the course without an additional work visa; and new mechanisms made it easier 
for students from “higher immigration risk” countries (such as Indonesia) to prove their 
financial capacity (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2009b).5 The increase in 
international enrolments was spectacular, growing 123% between 1997 and 2002; in 
comparison, domestic student numbers grew by only 8% over the same period. The number 
of international students residing in Australia doubled in that period, while those residing 
overseas increased by 186% (DEEWR, 2004). In 2006, there was a 51% increase over the 
previous year in all student visas issued, the largest proportion of them (44%) for higher 
education. By October 2009, international student numbers had increased 129% on the 2002 
levels to a total of 610,442 students, 200,909 of whom were enrolled in higher education 
(Table 1). This growth has been largely consistent despite fluctuations in rankings and 
absolute numbers among sending countries and temporary changes in response to shifts in 
Australian education policies, for instance with regard to scholarships and funding. Student 
numbers have been periodically affected by regulations on other funding sources, for 
instance, the recalibration of Malaysian government scholarship eligibility rules and 
priorities, while financial and political crises in source countries have caused slowdowns at 
times. The student profile has also shifted in response to policy changes in the Australian and 
Commonwealth scholarships. For example, the policy of gender equity implemented by the 
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) announced in 1976, 
which aimed to award half of all scholarships to female students by 1997. Rates of female 
AIDAB scholars surged: from 1989-91, women’s share of AIDAB scholarships increased 
from 27% to 39%, while the number of women supported for PhD studies increased fivefold 
(Shu and Hawthorne, 1995: 124). 
Table 1. Top ten countries of origin for foreign students, 2002-09 
 
Source: Data from AEI (2009b). 
Australian policies on international students are also tied explicitly to those on skilled 
migration, with close co-operation between the relevant ministries. Australia is not alone in 
finding in international students a ready source of skilled workers; such schemes are common 
among developed countries. Over half of the international students awarded doctorates in the 
USA in 1996, for instance, remained in the USA five years later, including the vast majority 
of those from China and India, the top two source countries. Australia has adopted 
particularly proactive policies on this front. Amendments since the late 1990s have made it 
easier for overseas students who earn qualifications in Australia to apply for General Skilled 
Migration visas (Ziguras and Law, 2006: 61-5). These measures open up a ready pool of 
skilled migrants, at the start of their working lives, with proven fluency in English and readily 
recognised qualifications, and who are already familiar with local life and culture – a 
resource especially important given Australia’s aging local population (Ziguras and Law, 
2006). In addition, although the Department of Immigration emphasises that students should 
not base their educational choices solely on hopes for migration, the points system for 
applications for permanent resident (PR) status has been amended to privilege those with 
Australian tertiary qualifications, particularly if they have skills in demand (Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, 2009a). 
Graduates of Australian higher education institutions and, in particular, those who have 
studied in-country for at least two years and/or at the doctoral level, are accorded additional 
points toward their application, even without a family sponsor in Australia. From 2003, those 
who had studied outside the major metropolitan areas for at least two years gained yet more 
points, on the presumption that they would be more likely to settle in those areas, thus 
helping to redistribute the skilled labour force and disperse students away from the major 
metropolitan universities (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2009a).6 Also, from 
2001, overseas students under 45 years of age were able to apply for PR status while still in 
Australia (rather than returning home first), and were eligible for an 18-month temporary visa 
to allow them to gain skilled work experience, improve their English language skills or 
undertake a professional year – all of which increased their chances for a General Skilled 
Migration visa if they did not yet meet the criteria. Holders of this class of temporary visa 
could apply under the General Skilled Migration scheme at any time (Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, 2010a). Reflecting these adjustments, the rates of students 
applying for and receiving PR status increased. For example, most of the 5101 Malaysians 
who obtained PR status in 2003-04 had Australian qualifications – meaning that a large 
proportion of local Malaysian graduates had successfully sought to remain in Australia 
(Ziguras and Law, 2006: 66). 
Individuals excluded from these opportunities to settle in Australia include recipients of 
particular scholarship schemes, such as the Australian Development Scholarships and Asian 
Leadership Awards administered by AusAID, which are open only to citizens of countries in 
which Australia has a significant aid programme. As the goals of these scholarships are to 
foster economic and social development in those countries, as well as to foster partnerships 
and linkages between Asia-Pacific countries and Australia, recipients of these awards are 
required to return to their country of citizenship for at least two years after graduation. 
Students who violate the terms of the award must repay the full amount of their scholarship.7 
Importantly, also, graduates of Australian offshore programmes do not receive the same 
preference in applications for skilled migration to Australia as those who studied in Australia 
(Ziguras and Law, 2006: 69). Overall, these policies demonstrate a clear expectation that 
studying in Australia will foster some degree of affinity for the country – that international 
students will want to become “Australian” and will understand the content of that identity. 
Student demographics 
Despite ongoing restrictions on some groups of students from the region, Asians now 
constitute well over 80% of international student enrolments in Australia at the tertiary level. 
Students from mainland China have come to dominate the source country profile, more than 
quadrupling in number since 2002 and, in 2009, representing almost 32% of a total of 
200,909 international students enrolled at Australian tertiary education institutions (AEI, 
2009b). India, consistently the second largest source country since 2004, accounted for a 
further 13% of international enrolments in that year; its share has grown rapidly since 1991, 
when only 378 Indians were enrolled at any level of the education system (Gillan et al., 2003: 
1396). Southeast Asia, historically the most important source of international students, also 
continues to factor significantly in the higher education sector, accounting for approximately 
22% of all enrolments, with the overwhelming majority coming from Malaysia, Singapore 
and Indonesia. 
These three countries have long been a core component of international education in 
Australia. More Malaysians study in Australia than in any other foreign country, including in 
the USA and UK combined, with an estimated 250,000 Malaysians having graduated from 
Australian institutions since the 1950s (AEI, 2007). Among Malaysians, Colombo Plan grants 
were especially attractive to ethnic minorities, who were increasingly squeezed out of local 
universities through the 1970s and 1980s. Many Malaysians remained in Australia upon 
completion of their studies and, as a result, the local Malaysian population (overwhelmingly 
non-Malay) more than doubled each decade from the 1950s to the 1980s, before economic 
growth in Malaysia by the 1990s helped stem the tide. Migration levels then increased again, 
reaching new highs with the skilled migration scheme. Australia is also the top overseas 
destination for Singaporean higher education students, while approximately one-third of 
Indonesian overseas students choose to study in Australia. Either Singapore or Malaysia sent 
the highest number of students of any country to Australia throughout the 1990s and into the 
2000s. In addition, they rank number one and two respectively in hosting offshore 
programmes of Australian universities, together accounting for well over half of all such 
programmes (Universities Australia, 2005: table D.10).8 Though neither Anglophone like 
Singapore nor so wealthy even as Malaysia, Indonesia held the number 4 spot until 2002, 
until outpaced by China (Universities Australia, 2005: table D.2). Numbers have, of course, 
fluctuated, for instance dipping noticeably in 1998 and 1999 for Indonesians and Malaysians 
alike in the wake of the Asian Economic Crisis, as well as in 1995, when Indonesian 
enrolments fell by more than half for no discernable reason (Universities Australia, 2005: 
table D.7). Numbers of Indonesian and Singaporean students have declined significantly from 
the early 2000s (AEI, 2009b), although IDP Education (2007) maintains that enrolments of 
the former are predicted to more than double by 2025. 
Despite these fluctuations, in 2009, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia represented the third, 
fourth and fifth largest source countries for the Australian higher education system, behind 
relative newcomers China and India, with 17,268 Malaysians, 7957 Singaporeans and 7878 
Indonesians enrolled in the Australian higher education system. Among other Southeast 
Asian countries, only Vietnam and Thailand were among the top ten source countries in 2009 
and at dramatically lower levels (see Table 1). Patterns vary by state and territory: the 
greatest proportion of Indonesian higher education students attended institutions in Victoria 
and New South Wales, while Singaporeans and Malaysians were concentrated in Victoria, 
Western Australia and New South Wales. In addition, although Chinese students consistently 
represented the highest number of overseas students in any Australian state or territory in 
2009, Malaysians were the second largest group in South Australia, Western Australia, 
Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the third largest group in Victoria 
and Queensland, while Indonesians constituted the fourth largest group in Victoria and the 
fifth largest group in New South Wales, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. 
Despite its tiny size, Singapore was the third largest source country for international tertiary 
students in Western Australia and Tasmania, the fourth largest for the ACT and the fifth 
largest for South Australia and Victoria (AEI, 2009b). Students from all three states have 
some access to scholarships, though an increasing number (a majority of Singaporeans and 
many non-Malay Malaysians and Chinese Indonesians) are self-funded, driven both by the 
better opportunities offered by an Australian education and by scarce comparable options at 
home. 
Student organisations and affiliations 
As Melucci (1995: 42, 51) asserts, collective identity is best understood as a self-reflexive, 
constructed process, which he dubs identization: how social actors come to recognise 
themselves as part of a collective, maintain that collective and see collective action as 
sensible. Put differently, “[t]he empirical unity of a social movement should be considered as 
a result rather than a starting point, a fact to be explained rather than evidence” (Melucci, 
1995: 43). Melucci (1995: 44) defines the resultant collective identity as “an interactive and 
shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and 
concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in 
which the action takes place.” 
Historically, the ranks of activists in the home countries considered here have swelled with 
returning graduates, not least from Australia, who developed both ideological leanings and 
practical expertise through issue- or religion-based student activism overseas. In the past, too, 
Southeast Asian students in Australia have played important supporting roles in social 
movement campaigns in their home countries. For instance, Singaporeans involved with the 
Network of Overseas Students’ Collective in Australia (NOSCA) rallied to co-ordinate 
protest activities in support of a group of Singaporean activists detained under the Internal 
Security Act in 1987 (Rerceretnam, 2005). Similarly, Indonesian students in Australia were 
politically active in the mid-1990s, sometimes very radically, with a home country or 
regional focus – aided not only by the fact that student unionism was then compulsory, so 
facilities and forums were always available, but also by the Australian government’s offering 
scholarships at that time not only to academics and government officials but also to other 
qualified applicants, a number of whom worked for NGOs in Indonesia. As one of our 
respondents explained, in the mid- 1990s, when he first came to Australia to study, 
Indonesian students circulated papers on a wide range of political topics, organised 
discussion groups, and more. He went on to note that there is a preponderance of his then-
peers among those now active in local politics in Indonesia (in Malaysia, see Weiss, 2011: ch. 
5). 
However, politics is “no longer cool” among the current generation of Indonesian students. 
Changes in Indonesian politics since the late 1990s undoubtedly play a role: the level of 
political freedom students experience in Australia is no longer so starkly different from back 
home, nor – since the fall of Soeharto – is regime change so pressing. Moreover, Southeast 
Asian students now have little opportunity or desire to engage with the host culture, including 
through their student unions. Most of those we spoke to in 2008 and 2009 spent the bulk of 
their social life outside class with fellow international students, particularly co-nationals and 
secondarily, other Asians. Indeed, a sense of being “Asian,” associating with fellow Asians 
(for instance, sitting with them for meals) and being seen as “Asian” by Australians and 
others was marked among informants. These findings echo those for the secondary school 
level, where the everyday experiences of international students “were marked by separation 
and disconnection from local students” and a “heightened awareness of national, cultural, 
ethnic and racial difference influenced their choice of friends,” even if cross-national linkages 
developed among international students (Matthews and Sidhu, 2005: 59-60). Some studies 
suggest that if not overt racism, then at least institutional shortcomings in truly 
accommodating overseas students, are responsible for international students’ isolation, in 
Australia as elsewhere. Efforts at internationalisation within Australian universities and 
schools tend to focus on relatively tokenistic steps, such as holding an annual International 
Fiesta or providing halal food, rather than pedagogical initiatives to bring a more global 
perspective to university curricula (see, for example, Sidhu, 2004: 58). Reflecting the 
findings of other studies, our interviewees’ reasons for not spending more time with 
Australians ranged from a simple lack of time, to discomfort with colloquial Australian 
English, to their inability (for religious reasons) to hang out drinking in pubs. Few of our 
informants had had bad experiences with Australians, for instance, racial slurs, though a 
number of informants – particularly, but not only, Muslim women who wear headscarves – 
mentioned some personal or a friend’s experience of harassment, while a small number felt 
themselves to be the target of Australians’ frustration with Asian immigration, as seen in a 
series of violent attacks against Indians in Australia in 2009 (The Australian, 5 January 
2009). Several people also noted marginalisation among Muslims, having experienced 
discrimination, for instance by the students of Middle Eastern origin who dominate Sydney 
University’s Muslim Students’ Association. However, there is commonly also a simple 
comfort factor, as well, in finding a critical mass of co-nationals. 
It is not necessarily the case that students identify collectively as “students” in any sense that 
is more meaningful (say in terms of an activist identity) than the functional category of 
people who study. Nor is it a given that a cluster of individuals would identify in terms of 
citizenship – or of geopolitical region, for that matter – when overseas. Among our 
informants, however, most did identify quite strongly along national lines. Just as most 
Indonesians, regardless of background, insisted they identify first and foremost as 
“Indonesian,” then perhaps as “Indonesian” and “Muslim,” most Malaysians claimed to 
identify as “Malaysian” and most Singaporeans as “Singaporean,” rather than primarily by 
ethnicity. Our Indonesian informants, in particular, took pride in being open-minded and 
displayed a high degree of tolerance for ethnic and religious difference. For instance, one 
Chinese Indonesian student described the Indonesian community at her Australian university 
as “much more open” than communities in Indonesia. Another student, a Sundanese from 
West Java, described relationships between Indonesians in Australia as “less polarised” and 
more empathetic. A third, of mixed Chinese and Javanese background, felt that other 
Indonesians were “more accepting” abroad than at home. A fourth, a Buginese, noted the lack 
of groups based on ethnicity among Indonesian students in Australia and described relations 
as “harmonious” and “inclusive.” These tendencies held, even though several non-Javanese 
and Chinese Indonesians described experiences of discrimination at home, and despite the 
fact that both Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians observed that Chinese Indonesians tend 
to form their own communities where numbers permit. Some non-Javanese also expressed a 
degree of frustration at the prevalence of Javanese language use in their presence or with 
Jakartans’ perceived sense of superiority, and some non-Muslim students at times felt 
excluded by the social focus on prayer meetings and other religious activities, as opposed to 
secular social activities, amongst their Muslim compatriots. Regardless of these and other 
minor tensions, however, Indonesian students reported living, eating and socialising with 
Indonesians of other ethnic groups, with whom they communicated primarily in the national 
language, and having friends from across religions. In short, in the Indonesian case, being 
part of a small community abroad brought a greater awareness of the shared culture of 
different groups of co-nationals. 
By contrast, despite granting discursive priority to their national (Malaysian) identity, Malays 
in our sample did not tend to mix with Malaysians of other ethnic backgrounds while abroad. 
Many had more friends across community lines than they had had in Malaysia but these 
remained a relatively small part of their social world. Non-Malays in particular noted 
Malay/non-Malay divisions, echoing patterns at home. These divisions are reflected in 
language use. Although Malays do speak Malay among themselves, and are likely to speak 
Malay with Chinese and Indians at home, they tend to use English with Malaysians of 
Chinese and Indian background while in Australia. This preference may be presumed to 
reflect longstanding divisions in Malaysia where, however much a national language and 
lingua franca, Malay remains to a large extent an ethnic language, unlike Indonesian in 
Indonesia. Speaking English thus subtly reinforces the sense, carried over from Malaysia, of 
the “otherness” of non-Malays. The fact that Malaysian students were less likely than their 
Indonesian peers to subordinate subnational identities confirms the fungibility of these 
identity patterns. 
Perhaps, more surprisingly, although some Malaysians of Malay ethnicity did have 
Indonesian friends and vice versa, such friendships were not present to a substantially greater 
degree than with Asians of other nationalities. Moreover, despite the fact that Indonesian and 
Malay are mutually-intelligible variants on the same language, many Malaysians – including 
ethnic Malays – tend to speak English with Indonesians. These linguistic practices prompted 
some of our Indonesian informants to describe Malaysians as “stand-offish,” though the latter 
insisted they were just trying to improve their language skills. Indeed, despite linguistic and 
ethnic proximity, Malay and Indonesian students professed little special closeness; most 
scoffed at the notion of being bangsa serumpun (peoples from a single root, a common idiom 
for the nations’ cultural proximity). Political squabbles between Indonesia and Malaysia, for 
example, a spat over “ownership” of common folk songs, also loomed large among 
Indonesian students, at least at a superficial level.9 Meanwhile, Singaporean students, nearly 
all of whom primarily speak English while at home or abroad, generally keep their distance 
from Indonesian and Malaysian students, with whom they feel they have little in common, 
even while identifying broadly as “Asian.” 
It is not surprising, then, that to the extent that these students do mobilise, they tend to join 
country-specific organisations, encouraged further by the fact that each Australian university 
has a network of clubs for students of different nationalities. For Indonesians, these clubs are 
generally within the Indonesian government-sanctioned Australian Indonesian Student 
Association (Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia Australia, PPIA) network, while Malaysians 
usually have a Malaysian Student Association (though names vary). Singaporeans may have 
their own organisations or, less commonly, have a joint association with Malaysians. 
Members of these associations are generally international students, but some members are 
Permanent Residents who have come from those countries. The strength of these clubs varies 
by campus with enrolments of that particular category of students, but also based on the 
history of the specific organisation. However, it is clear that Indonesians tend to be better 
organised and more tightly knit overall than Malaysians and especially Singaporeans. 
Broader Southeast Asian groups are scarce, and Indonesian and Malaysian student groups 
seldom collaborate other than in events like multicultural days organised by the Student 
Union. Indonesian student groups, for example, are more likely to associate with the 
Indonesian Student Association network world-wide, as well as maintaining ties with peers 
back in Indonesia. 
Apart from these country-specific organisations, the most common groups with which our 
informants were involved were religious ones. In particular, most Muslim students mentioned 
at least casual participation in Islamic study groups. Although most prayed on campus, 
among Muslim students from across nationalities, the organisations with which they were 
most closely associated, such as weekly prayer groups, again tended to follow national lines. 
A few students were involved in interfaith activities and some – generally Christians – joined 
(and made friends in) outside congregations, whether dominated by co-nationals or not. 
Postgraduate or undergraduate student engagement in extracurricular activities varies by 
campus. For instance, PPIA in Victoria and New South Wales is run primarily by 
undergraduates, while, in South Australia, postgraduates dominate. 
But what of student activism? Many of our contemporary informants from Malaysia and 
Indonesia had been activists of some kind in their home country – and might have been 
expected to bring those earlier experiences to their new campus life, informing continued 
engagement (Melucci, 1996: 298). However, unlike many in previous generations of students 
from the region, our interviewees’ lack of a political perspective or agenda, even among those 
who had a history of being politically engaged, was striking.10 
There were, nevertheless, significant variations among our informants by nationality. Most 
students from Indonesia kept up assiduously with the politics of their home country, although 
they generally paid far less heed to Australian or other international politics. By contrast, the 
quite dramatic Malaysian elections of 2008 attracted little interest among Malaysian students 
in Australia. The fact that most ethnic Malay students are on Malaysian government 
scholarships and subject to persistent scrutiny no doubt helps to deter political engagement, 
but even our non-Malay informants from Malaysia seemed not politically inclined. Likewise, 
trained from young not to engage politically and to take an instrumental approach to their 
school years, Singaporean students generally had little interest in politics. For example, one 
student observed that books on Singapore restricted at home were available for her to read in 
Australia. Yet, while being in Australia sharpened her perspective, distance also made 
engagement seem implausible. To a large extent, these variations parallel differences in the 
space available for mobilisation and recent history of political involvement among students in 
the informants’ respective home countries – with the greatest recent student activity in 
Indonesia and the least in Singapore – even when students abroad are not subject to the same 
legal constraints as those at domestic universities. 
Reflecting their greater engagement at home, it was the Indonesians who were most involved 
in politically oriented activities while in Australia. Most Indonesian students nevertheless 
chose to align themselves primarily with groups formed overwhelmingly for purposes of 
association and sociability rather than resistance or contention of any sort. In particular, the 
PPIA’s links with the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs severely limits its members’ 
ability to pursue political ambitions. As a result, those who engage politically most 
commonly do so through politically orientated religious groups, such as Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU, lit. the awakening of the religious scholars) or the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), organisations with which some of these students had already been 
engaged prior to arriving in Australia.11 These allegiances sometimes spill over into 
ostensibly apolitical activities, as occurred with tensions between PKS and NU factions at the 
ANU, which affected activities run by the PPIA. However, apart from the occasional 
politically charged incident – for instance, seminars on the conflict in Papua – hardly any 
Indonesian students claimed any significant secular political involvement themselves, nor 
mentioned others from their cohort so engaged. Indeed, when one focus group participant 
mentioned that she was a member of the Australian leftist organisation, Socialist Alternative, 
the other students present were extremely surprised. 
Southeast Asian students’ lack of engagement in part reflects the fact that only a small sub-
set of their number engage with “mainstream” campus groups or campaigns – the primary 
outlets for activism available on Australian campuses. Indeed, the principal non-nationally or 
ethnically based groups with which our informants mentioned involvement were the student 
union (primarily its international student and multicultural committees or initiatives) and 
religious groups, both on and off campus. Several students participate, too, in “mainstream” 
campus-wide sporting groups, albeit mostly in sports popular in Asia like badminton and 
table tennis, or in residence hall-level activities (though in the case of Toad Hall at the ANU, 
where almost half the resident population is Indonesian, Asian students’ engagement in 
residence-based activities need not signal broader integration). Others, particularly 
postgraduates, are engaged at the school or faculty level, though again, certain parts of the 
university are heavily international, for instance, Sydney’s Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies, or specifically Indonesian-dominated, such as the ANU’s Public Policy programme. 
Still other students are in transnational networks, such as the business-orientated AIESEC 
(Association Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Economiques et Commerciales). 
Their lack of political engagement also reflects the particular character of the students 
themselves and their specific situation. Some informants noted that they could learn more 
about their country from afar than from within, but were neither willing nor able to respond – 
as was the case of the Singaporean student described above. Discouraging activism among 
Malaysians, too, at least for holders of Malaysian government scholarships (as is the case for 
most ethnic Malay students in Australia) is a compulsory pre-departure citizenship course and 
the requirement to submit biannual progress reports, covering both academic matters and 
extracurricular involvement, to the government. In contrast, Malay students at home have 
been heavily mobilised in Islamist student groups, many with a distinct political – and in 
many cases, oppositional – slant, since at least the 1970s, even when non-Malay students 
have been less engaged (for instance, Zainah, 1987). Intriguingly, also, a collective identity as 
students appears to be most poorly defined among postgraduate informants. The latter were 
more likely to imagine themselves beyond nationality as current or future public servants, 
with a duty to help society not now (especially given their far remove while in Australia), but 
after graduation. In addition, many postgraduates are funded either by their own or their host 
government, perhaps increasing their sense that protest would be “ungrateful.” Seen from 
another perspective, short-term students, especially busy postgraduates, often in Australia 
with their spouses and children,12 are more likely to avoid recalibrating their identity to fit a 
new circumstance, even if that means downplaying a potentially empowering student identity 
that lends itself to mobilisation in preference for maintaining a familiar, home-away-from-
home ethno-nationalist niche. 
Temporary Transnationals 
Students across Asia have long histories both of activism and of studying abroad, yet little is 
known about how these two tendencies converge. Our exploration of Indonesian, Malaysian 
and Singaporean students in a host country in which large numbers of their co-nationals have 
long studied allows us to broach that question. Students from these three states vary in their 
recent national histories of student activism and in their experience of nationhood; the very 
students we met displayed corresponding proclivities. And yet these patterns shifted overseas, 
notwithstanding the relatively brief duration of these students’ time as migrants. The 
orientations of our informants were clearly influenced by place: many Indonesians and 
Malaysians had been more active as students in their home country settings and most claimed 
they identified less keenly in national terms prior to coming to Australia. It is, therefore, 
worth taking a step back to consider the presumed effects of international education, 
understood in terms of citizenship, outlook and identity, on questions of activism. 
Importantly, these findings are not unique to Australia or to students from these particular 
home countries; Australia’s strong external orientation and the long-term clustering of these 
specific students simply make for a particularly revealing case study of a larger phenomenon. 
Critics and cheerleaders of globalisation alike tend to presume shifts in subjectivity among 
those subject to its flows, but as our exploration of international students’ collective identities 
suggests, such changes are far from automatic. Australia has been at the forefront globally of 
efforts to promote a more cosmopolitan outlook through international education, starting 
below the tertiary level. Yet, one study of international education efforts at the secondary 
school level in Queensland, for instance, found not only pervasive and persistent discourses 
of nationality and identity that reinforced old affiliations and even spurred new “racial” ones, 
but also a firmly neo-liberal, instrumental bent to the ideas of global citizenship. Augmenting 
the presence of international students in schools, in other words, does not automatically 
trigger “globally oriented subjectivities” – a concept that aligns with Tarrow’s (2005: 42-3) 
presentation of “rooted cosmopolitanism,” though with an emphasis more on humanist moral 
obligations than transnational activism per se – among either those students or their local 
classmates (Matthews and Sidhu, 2005). The current project reaffirms the real disjuncture 
between studying abroad or amidst/about other cultures and identifying in “global” terms. 
As this contrast suggests, a distinction can be made between open, encompassing 
“cosmopolitans” (who may still be nationalistic even if identifying also as citizens of the 
world) and closed, defensive “locals” – though in reality, many or most fall somewhere in 
between. Importantly, however, even one exposed daily to other cultures, media and people 
may not be cosmopolitan in posture (Roudometof, 2005: 69-70). As Roudometof (2005: 65) 
explains, 
the creation of transnational social spaces leads to a bifurcation of attitudes… 
expressed in terms of a continuum with cosmopolitanism at the one end and 
localism at the other end. Overall, the relationship between transnationalism and 
the cosmopolitan-local continuum cannot be predetermined in theoretical terms. 
Tarrow (2005: 42-3) offers a further refinement in elaborating on the concept of “rooted 
cosmopolitans,” or “individuals whose primary ties are domestic but who are part of the 
complex international society,” a concept popularised in the 1990s. Some, but not all, rooted 
cosmopolitans are transnational activists, “who mobilize domestic and international resources 
and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, 
or in favour of goals they hold in common with transnational allies.” Most in this sub-set 
emerge from and return to domestic activism, are better educated and better connected than 
the average citizen, travel more and speak more languages, allowing them to shift among 
levels and activities in a complex international society. These criteria suggest that overseas 
students would seem likely candidates for this status and, yet, our informants privilege their 
roots over a supranational identity, even while acknowledging their changed perspectives, 
and are less prone to activism than many of their host or home country peers. 
Our research emphasises the high degree of agency among students in mediating the local 
and the global, but also the real constraints on their choices. What we seem to find are 
temporarily uprooted locals, who do develop a global sensibility and outsider’s perspective 
on their home country, but not necessarily coupled to any real sense of cosmopolitan efficacy. 
Nor are these students “flexible citizens,” as described by Aihwa Ong (1999). They do take 
advantage of chances to, in Ong’s terms (1996: 6), “accumulate capital and social prestige in 
the global arena,” via “flexibility, mobility, and repositioning in relation to markets… and 
cultural regimes,” but their pursuit of economic opportunities actually refines, rather than 
attenuates, their sense of patriotic attachment. Students not only recognise a time limit to their 
stint overseas, notwithstanding the possibility (which a number of our informants planned to 
pursue) of obtaining PR status, but occupy a liminal space of an increasingly “universal” 
university. It is not uncommon for international students, imbued with their host country’s 
academic culture, to “return home with a desire to transform their universities in ways that 
often prove to be both unrealistic and unattainable” (Altbach, 2004: 12). A large number of 
the students in our sample shared these sorts of ideals, though most fully expected difficulties 
upon their return. Moreover, while most hoped to maintain the sort of openness and tolerance 
common and cultivated in Australia, others had doubts as to how well that could or would be 
sustained. 
Our informants overwhelmingly identified as what we might term “cosmopolitan locals.” 
They are aware of their broader place in the world, are familiar and generally comfortable 
with being outside their own country and community and have a sense of themselves as 
“Asian” and “international” (though not, for the most part, as “Southeast Asian”). Several 
used terms such as “glocalised” to describe their perspective. At the same time, even most of 
those who seem likely to seek Australian PR status were both patriotic for their home country 
and clearly prone to surround themselves with co-nationals. Several mentioned efforts to be 
especially virtuous (religiously or otherwise) while overseas, not least to counter negative 
impressions of their country, but also out of a new-found interest in their heritage and 
customs. Theirs is, perhaps, a form of “long-distance nationalism” (identities and behaviours 
that connect diasporic individuals with their home country), but less actively engaged than 
Anderson’s (1983) formulation suggests. Rather, what seems at play is simply the effect of 
isolation and distance – exile, however voluntary or temporary – in heightening the students’ 
sense of their own difference and, hence, identity. 
Our data suggest that international education does heighten students’ sense of perspective on 
their home country and culture and exposes them – in the case of our informants, 
overwhelmingly favourably – to other normative and institutional environments. Yet, perhaps 
because international education is a clearly bounded stage in students’ lives, these temporary 
transnationals appear less likely than other diasporic communities to engage politically, 
whether in relation to their home country or their place of study. Being an international 
student, especially among a large cluster of co-nationals, seems likely to heighten rather than 
diminish national identity. In the process, their sojourn overseas accords students new agency 
to mould their own sensibilities and career and life paths, and does appear to erode 
subnational or ethnic affinities, at least to some extent, although possibly only in the short 
term. Even as students, our respondents generally displayed little faith in the durability of 
their new-found sensibilities and commitments, however aware they were of a change in their 
mindset since going abroad. At the same time, too, contemporary modes of international 
education appear to reduce individuals’ sense of immediate political agency rather than 
promoting political activism – although the general decline in student activism on Australian 
campuses as domestic students struggle to pay fees and study while earning a living clearly 
also contributes here. 
These findings are significant for our understanding both of the place of collective identity in 
processes of mobilisation and of concrete processes of globalisation and internationalisation. 
In terms of identity and mobilisation, the “cosmopolitan local” traits we note held regardless 
of students’ prior educational or activist background, religious or ethnic identity, or position 
within the university and its organisations. That consistency suggests the ways in which 
aspects of student status overrides other dimensions of identity, eliding, for instance, the 
differences across national subgroups in terms of their predilection for activism in the case of 
Malaysia. Student activists from the home countries in question may not be able to count on 
the support of co-nationals abroad to the same extent as they did in the past, nor are the latter 
likely to identify sufficiently with host country causes to mobilise there. These tendencies 
should temper our expectations of the idealist potential of the internationalisation of higher 
education (Stier, 2004: 88-92). Rather, instrumentalist and educationalist frames seem more 
germane, at least on the individual level, notwithstanding planners’ manifest expectations as 
reflected in changing immigration rules, of a real identity shift through higher education. 
More broadly, we see in this case study both the mutability of collective identity and the 
parameters beyond which identity categories will not easily shift. Subsequent studies might 
trace what does happen to these students once they return home after graduation: are those 
who are most pessimistic as students about the odds of sustaining their new affiliations and 
perspectives long term, indeed the ones most likely to revert to old forms, or does perhaps 
heightened self-awareness prompt especial vigilance? Longitudinal analysis – again, beyond 
the scope of the current study – could likewise track students’ self-assessments for 
cosmopolitanism, then assess the relative scores of those international students who do 
engage politically, when such engagement happens. And further research could compare 
students with other temporary transnationals – with the caveat that few other forms of 
migration are so definitively bounded and unrepeatable, let alone vested with so widely 
embraced an alternative collective identity as that of “student.” For now, though, our 
purposefully modest scope is revealing in terms of understanding how students’ identity 
overseas, given changing patterns of migration and immigration regimes, affects their socio-
political sensibilities and levels of engagement – findings that speak to scholarship and 
policies relating to international students and their organisations, but also to scholars of 
collective action and mobilisation broadly, particularly as migratory flows swirl ever faster 
and with ever greater differentiation. 
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Notes 
1 There is a very involved literature on precisely what globalisation encompasses, how best to understand and 
describe it, and how much agency is implicit in these processes. Those works are largely outside the scope of the 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
current study. For a useful exercise in testing theories of globalisation as applied to higher education, however, 
including a comparison of Indonesian and Australian institutions’ understandings and experiences, see 
Marginson and Sawir (2005). For a focus specifically on how universities of the developing world experience 
globalisation, see Altbach (2004). 
2 On Chinese and Indian students, see Rizvi (2005). 
3 The dominance of Southeast Asians did not reflect a lack of demand from India or China, but rather was a 
product of the politics of Australia’s restrictive immigration policy. In 1948, for example, Francis Stuart, the 
political secretary at the Australian Commission in Singapore, urged the government to encourage Indonesian, 
Thai and Burmese students because Southeast Asians were unlikely to want to stay permanently, unlike Indians 
and the Chinese. In a communication to McMahon Ball in that year, Stuart commented that “If we are honest we 
will admit that the White Australia policy is really a Chinese-and-Indian-restriction policy” (cited in Megarrity, 
2005: 33). 
4 The prior question of who chooses to study in Australia and why is beyond the scope of this work, though we 
do touch on the push and pull factors encouraging students from our target countries to pursue an Australian 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree. Instead, we emphasise what these students do while overseas. 
5 In March 2010, Malaysians and Singaporeans are deemed minimal risk (level 1 of 5); Indonesian students are 
rated a slightly higher risk (level 2 of 5) (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010b: 2-3). 
6 The points test (under which Australian graduates are privileged, particularly if they have attended a regional 
institution) was revised in 2010, considerably changing the conditions for Australian-educated applicants. At the 
end of that year, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the Minister for Tertiary Education 
announced a review of the student visa programme, along with the package of measures for the international 
education sector. 
7 The more widely-available Endeavour Programme scholarships, administered by the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEST), on the other hand, are to bolster education and sciences, in 
particular, featuring Australia’s strengths in these areas and fostering transnational links. See AusAID (2009) for 
details. 
8 Many of Australia’s overseas campuses have been either marginal or unsuccessful. The University of New 
South Wales’ decision to abort its ambitious plan to establish a Singaporean campus in 2007 has been described 
as ‘‘one of the Australian higher education sector’s worst business failures’’ (The Australian, 27 June 2007). 
9 Some Indonesian members of a traditional dance group at the ANU were reluctant even to let Malaysians join, 
in light of this controversy. 
10 There are exceptions, however. Kell and Vogl (2007: 25) mention a threatened hunger strike over university 
services and fees among international students at the Melbourne campus of the University of Queensland in 
2006 and increasing resentment among international students who feel themselves to be ‘‘cash cows’’ for a 
struggling system. 
11 These organisations actively seek support among students, as had the Indonesian Association of Muslim 
Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) in the 1990s 
12 While other studies suggest women are particularly prone to feel constrained by family obligations during 
overseas studies (for instance, Shu and Hawthorne, 1995), we noted little difference in male and female 
informants’ experience of such pressures. Male students, for instance, were as likely to schedule interviews 
around child-minding duties, and women in Australia with their families participated actively in PPIA and other 
organisations – or, if they did not, they expressed reasons similar to those of male peers. Some Muslim women 
did report, though, pressure to dress or comport themselves in particular ways, to a far greater degree than they 
experienced at home. 
